I had my interview with “Chairman Mao” in his own house – a roomy cave-dwelling sheltered beneath Yenan’s towering cliffs. We would begin talking early in the evening, and often carry on far into the night, with the candles guttering on the table between us, throwing grotesque shadows across the curving roof. The room was piled with iron despatch boxes, and radio messages arrived constantly, which Mao read in the intervals between answering questions. Wu Liang-p’ing acted as interpreter, and Mao – with his usual care over details – insisted that everything I wrote should be translated back later into Chinese, so that he might check his statements.
          “What is the general attitude of the Chinese Communists towards the present war?” was my first question.
          “Before the actual outbreak of hostilities,” Mao began, “the Communist Party had repeatedly warned the country that war with Japan was inevitable, and that all Japan’s talk of ‘peaceful settlements,’ all the beautiful phrases of Japanese diplomats, were only so much camouflage to screen Japan’s preparations for war. We repeatedly pointed out the necessity of strengthening the National United Front and realizing a revolutionary policy, {111} in order to wage a victorious war of national liberation.
          “The most important thing of all, we insisted, was the adoption by the Chinese Government of a democratic system, so that the masses of the people might be mobilized for active participation.... The outbreak and development of the war have proved that this analysis was correct.” Mao went on to quote from a number of recent communist manifestoes, all of which concentrated on one central point: the realization of a “nationwide, inclusive war of resistance” against Japan.
          “What do you think should be the foreign policy of China at the present time?”
          “One principle,” Mao stated, “should determine all our foreign policy – to work towards an international Peace Front of all nations opposed to Japanese aggression. Morally, the international situation is not unfavorable to China: but the program of such a Peace Front as this must be decided not only by words, but also by action.
          “Most important, for China, is the policy of Great Britain and the U.S.A. These two countries are especially endangered by the fascist aggressors both East and West. And hitherto England and America, notwithstanding their friendly words, have in fact by their policies aided the fascist aggressors. This was because they spoke, but did not act. Words without action to support them have in reality let the fascist countries have a free hand, and have thus objectively favored the fascists. Now the fascist powers of the world are endangering the very existence of the democratic powers; it is all the more necessary to have unity of action in order to meet this challenge. A united Peace Front of the kind we propose is very necessary not only for China in her present struggle, but also for the safety and continued existence of the democratic powers.”
          Mao’s conception of the Japanese objectives in China was, quite simply, the “liquidation” of China as a whole. He considered North China and the Yangtse Valley the immediate military objectives, but was sure that the Japanese would never make more than a temporary halt until they had reduced all China to the status of a Japanese colony. {112}
          “How effective has the Chinese resistance proved so far?” I asked him.
          Mao divided his answer into two sections, positive and negative.
          “On the one hand,” he observed, “we may say that the Chinese resistance so far has been effective, to a very considerable degree. In the first place, the present war is of a kind that has never occurred since China was first penetrated by foreign imperialism – a war of genuinely revolutionary character. In the second place, this war has brought about the political unification of China, which for so long was divided and disunited. Thirdly, China’s war of resistance has aroused international sympathy – throughout the world, the past contempt at China’s non-resistance in the face of Japanese aggression has been changed into a new respect for the China of today.
          “On the other hand, certain weaknesses have appeared in the Chinese resistance during the last few months....” These weaknesses Mao summarized as political backwardness on the part of some elements within the nation, the lack of a common program agreed upon by all parties, and certain vital errors of military strategy. His critique of the early conduct of the war was advanced very frankly, and with complete sincerity. It was obvious that he thought less of scoring political “points” than of advocating what he believed to be a more effective general policy. And he was not wanting in constructive suggestions, as I found when I asked my next question.
          “What, in your opinion, are the necessary conditions for successful resistance to Japan?”
          Mao again divided his answer into two sections, political and military.
          “On the political side,” he said, “first of all we must modify the present government into a real United Front government, in which representatives of all sections of the people will participate. This government should be democratic, and at the same time centralized. The people must be given freedom of speech, assembly and organization, and the right to arm themselves against the enemy, so that the war may have a mass character. {113} Not only is it necessary for the people to have democratic freedom, but there must be a real improvement in the people’s livelihood.... Only by such measures can the people be induced to support the government unanimously.
          “On the military side,” he continued, “we must realize a general modification of the existing system. Most important is the change of strategy from ‘simple defense’ to active attack upon the enemy. Old-style armies must be changed to new-style armies. Compulsory mobilization must be replaced by political mobilization. Disunited command must give way to a united command. Any conditions of indiscipline and estrangement from the common people must be changed by the adoption of a conscious discipline and a principle of non-violation of the interests of the people. The situation of a war of regular armies must be changed into a situation where the fighting of the regular armies is more and more combined with the partisan warfare of the people.” Mao had very much more to say about the “Ten Point Program” of his own party; but the main outline is sufficiently clear from the statements quoted here. And perhaps the most interesting thing about these eminently practical suggestions, put forward with all appearance of sincerity by a man whom the Kuomintang had long regarded as their mortal enemy, was that every one of them could be reinforced by a text from Sun Yat-sen. What the Chinese Communists were demanding, in fact, was that the Kuomintang should begin to put into practice some parts of its own original program which it had long neglected.
          “The Kuomintang has partly realized the principle of Nationalism,” Mao summed up. “This has already appeared in the realization of the anti-Japanese war. But the principle of Democracy has not yet been realized, and neither has the principle of the People’s Livelihood. Because of this, a serious crisis has appeared in the present war.
          “Now, in the critical war period, is the time for the Kuomintang to recognize their own Sun Yat-senism, and put it into practice. If they do not put it into practice now, it will be too late afterwards for them to change their minds.” {113}
          The hour was late; and the yawning hsiao kwei who filled our tea cups was almost as sleepy as I was. But Mao seemed tireless, and only excused himself because a sheaf of telegrams claimed his attention. He walked out into the court with us, as Wu and I took our departure.
          “You must come again, and we will talk more together. Do you know the password? Then I will send a guard to go back with you.”
          We shook hands in the dark courtyard. Mao stood for a moment, a tall, impassive figure, looking up at the cliffs that cut the stars. Then he turned back without a hint of weariness to his all-night vigil.

On parting from Mao Tse-tung after this first long interview, I tried to note down a few impressions of the man that might stand against any future developments of a complex and changing situation. This leader of the communist movement in China has so often been described (though never by those who have met him) as an “extremist,” an embittered “class-revolutionary,” that I had half expected to find a brilliant fanatic. This is a notion that might even be gathered from some published photographs, for Mao’s long hair and careless dress seem points to support the legend.
          The briefest acquaintance with the man, however, with his warm humanity and unfailing sense of humor, is enough to dispel any suggestions of this kind. In plain fact, Mao Tse-tung struck me as having incomparably the coolest and most balanced mind I had encountered in China. Talking to him, one is immediately aware of an immense intellectual force, a brain moving easily and surely along orderly lines of thought. This penetrating intelligence is combined with an essentially practical approach to any problem, and with a deep understanding of his own countrymen.
          Mao Tse-tung is thoroughly Chinese; he has never been out of China, and has lived always in the closest possible contact with his own people, especially with Chinese peasants and workers. His command of political theory is something he owes, no doubt, to natural gifts, a well-trained mind, and an amazingly {115} retentive memory. He is an omnivorous reader, and a man of many interests. But what is un-Chinese about him (or at least, untypical of the Chinese intellectual) is his extraordinary grasp of detail, his capacity for sustained mental effort, and his obvious power of concentration on the task in hand without losing sight of ultimate objectives.
          I would say that Mao Tse-tung has in an unusual degree the subtlety and flexibility characteristic of the Chinese mind at its best – this is what makes him a successful strategist, in a country that has never been lacking in political acrobats. But dominating and controlling this (and it is a much rarer phenomenon in China) is a disciplined, relentlessly-driving human will. It is a formidable combination. The Chinese Revolution has no Lenin; but if anyone man stands in the same relation to the Chinese masses as Lenin appeared in his lifetime to the workers of Europe, that man is Mao Tse-tung.