As Marcel Gauchet has characterized it, the Declaration des droits de l'homme[*] was the work of six days of heated debate in August of 1789. The first six articles were penned on the 20th and 21st of August, while articles 7,8, and 9 came into shape by the evening of the 22nd. Over the next several days, through the 24th, there ensued a heated debate over the free expression of ideas, and especially over the free expression of religion – the result of which was the adoption of articles that explicitly advocated extensive toleration. The next five articles (12 through 16) were prepared separately and presented as a block. Article 17, the supposed linchpin of the “bourgeois Revolution,” was a last-minute addition of the 26th, hastily conceived, and poorly worded; it was, in short, an afterthought.

The Declaration has stood as a seemingly towering achievement, and indeed it has emerged as the longest-lived political statement to survive the revolutionary era. Originally, of course, the document was simply intended to serve as the preamble to the Constitution, and it functioned as such for the Constitution of 1791. In later years it "required" revision. But as time passed the original Declaration became a symbol of the "Principles of 1789." A "radical" statement in 1789, the Declaration nevertheless became a conservative document by 1793.

What do the first eleven articles tell us about the Old Regime? What, in other words, were the revolutionaries arguing against? What are the origins of Article 16? And what has been its influence on political philosophy since?
 


The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen

          The representatives of the French people, organized in National Assembly, considering that ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural,[1] inalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that such declaration, continually before all members of the social body, may be a perpetual reminder of their rights and duties;[2] in order that the acts of the legislative power and those of the executive power may constantly be compared with the aim of every political institution and may accordingly be more respected; in order that the demands of the citizens, founded henceforth upon simple and imcontestable principles, may always be directed towards the maintenance of the Constitution and the welfare of all.
          Accordingly, the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the Following rights of man and citizen.
          1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights; social distinctions may be based only upon general usefulness.
          2.  The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man; these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.
          3. The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no group, no individual may exercise authority not emanating expressly therefrom.
          4. Liberty consists of  the power to do whatever is not injurious to others; thus the enjoyment of the natural rights of every man has for its limits only those that assure other members of society the enjoyment of those same rights; such limits may be determined only by law.
          5. The law has the right to forbid only actions which are injurious to society. Whatever is not forbidden by law my not be prevented, and no one may be constrained to do what it does not prescribe.
          6. Law is the expression of the general will;[3] all citizens have the right to concur personally, or through their representatives, in its formation; it must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal before it, are equally admissible to all public offices, positions, and employments, according to their capacity, and without other distinction than that of virtues and talents.
          7. No man may be accused, arrested, or detained except in the cases determined by law, and according to the forms prescribed thereby. Whoever solicit, expedite, or execute arbitrary orders, or have them executed, must be punished; but every citizen summoned or apprehended in pursuance of the law must obey immediately; he renders himself culpable by resistance.
          8. The law is to establish only penalties that are absolutely and obviously necessary; and no one may be punished except by virtue of a law established and promulgated prior to the offence and legally applied.
          9. Since every man is presumed innocent until declared guilty, if arrest be deemed indispensable, all unnecessary severity for securing the person of the accused must be severely repressed by law.
          10. No one is to be disquieted because of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
          11. Free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Consequently, every citizen may speak, write, and print freely, subject to responsibility for the abuse of such liberty in the cases determined by law.
          12. The guarantee of the rights of man and citizen necessitates a public force; such a force, therefore, is instituted for the advantages of all and not for the particular benefit of those to whom it is entrusted.
          13. For the maintenance of the public force and for the expenses of administration a common tax is indispensable; it must be assessed equally on all citizens in proportion to their means.
          14. Citizens have the right to ascertain, by themselves or through their representatives, the necessity of the public tax, to consent to it freely, to supervise its use, and to determine its quota, assessment, payment, and duration.
          15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an accounting of his administration.
          16. Every society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured or the separation of powers not determined has no constitution at all.
          17. Since property is a scared and inviolable right, no one may be deprived thereof unless a legally established public necessity obviously requires it, and upon condition of a just and previous indemnity.[4]
 


Notes:

[*] This translation of the Declaration appears in John Hal Stewart's Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 113-115. [Transcription by John Dzerkacz]

[1] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the opening paragraphs of his Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité, destroyed the notion of Natural Rights, believing that previous theorists of the State of Nature had imported a notion (rights) that belonged only to the State of Civilization. Despite the obvious Rousseauesque rhetoric (see esp. Articles One through Three), Rousseau would have found the suggestion of “natural” rights profoundly disturbing.

[2] Later versions of the Declaration would, of course, contain prescribed duties for citizens, but in this, the first, version no such duties are enumerated.

[3] This is the most misunderstood notion in Rousseau's œuvre. In Du contrat social the Genevan philosopher states that the General Will is both the expression of all citizens and always for the good of all citizens. If something is not for the good of all, then it is not an expression of the General Will. Rousseau, in other words, was no totalitarian, and he would likely have found Robespierre a false prophet; he was a radical historicist, believing that governments could come in any form, so long as they acknowledged popular sovereignty.
          It ought not go unmentioned that the above definition was a widely accepted meaning of the notion of the General Will. For evidence that this was so, see Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie under this term.

[4] Rousseau stated clearly in his second Discours (first paragraph of part two) that the invention of property was the very act that created civil society; thus, it was impossible for any natural right to property to exist. For Rousseau, property itself created the problem of civilization, and one received the right to property only when one began to engage in politics; needless to say, solitary man could not engage in politics.
          Moreover, as Marcel Gauchet has demonstrated (in La Révolution des droits de l’homme), the question of property was never a first concern for the assembled and so-called bourgeois representatives; indeed, it was quite literally the last thing on their mind. Article 17 was tacked on only at the eleventh-hour insistence of Duport (see esp. Gauchet, 195).